Horizontal Inequalities

Obviously, people are not born with a sense of which group they belong to, who are friends and who enemies - this is socially constructed by family, community, state, etc. Each category may accentuate differences or reject them, changing perceptions and hence group mobilisation. Studies show a number of different ways groups have been differentiated and mobilised in contemporary conflicts. Group identity is largely ‘constructed’ by political leaders, who find group cohesion and mobilisation a powerful mechanism in their competition for power and resources, adopting a strategy of ‘reworking of historical memories’ to engender group identity. Numerous examples have shown how ‘ethnicity was used by political and intellectual elites prior to, or in the course of , wars’ (Alexander et al., p 5). In the Balkans it was religion that was used for the major categorising feature which resulted to mass ethnic cleansing. Another source of differentiation is often regional location, which can, but does not always, coincide with ethnic or language divisions.

The type of conflicts with which we are recently confronted most are organised group conflicts: that is to say they are not exclusively a matter of individuals randomly committing violence against others. What is involved is group mobilisation, and we need to understand the underlying motivation for such mobilisation. Group organisation may be quite informal, but it exists, implying that there is a degree of agreement (often implicit) on purposes and activities within the group. Normally there are those within any group instigating conflict, who lead or orchestrate the conflict, including constructing or enhancing the perception of group identity in order to achieve group mobilisation; and those who actively carry out the fighting, or give it some support - these two categories acting as leaders and followers, though there can be considerable overlap between the two. In ‘On Violence’, Hannah Arendt distinguishes between justification and legitimacy in terms of power and the use of violence. For Arendt, violence is always instrumental; it is always a means to an end. Power, on the other hand, is an end in itself. Power rests on legitimacy, which appeals to the past, while violence and its justification, situated within a means-end schema, is directed toward the future. Violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate;; it can never lead to power, and it only appears where power is in jeopardy (Arendt, 1972). Hence, violence as an instrument is used in order to achieve other ends; where the declared objective is political, is to secure or sustain power; while power is wanted for the advantages it offers, especially the possibilities of economic gains. However, power relations- the politics- of the contemporary world order tend to operate through a continuum of violence, the common substance through which various modes of power manifest.

It should be noted that it is not necessarily the relatively deprived who instigate violence. The
privileged may do so, fearing loss of position. For example, the prospect of possible loss of political power can act as a powerful motive for state-sponsored violence which occurs with the aim of suppressing opposition and maintaining power. Since the government has access to an organised force (police/army) and to finance, state terrorism is sometimes an important source of humanitarian emergencies. It has been pointed out that state violence is more often
than not the initiating cause in recent conflicts. The state can deliberately foster violence to undermine opposition groups, often provoking violent reactions by its actions to justify militarization and its budget allocation.

It must be noted that democratic institutions are not sufficient to prevent inequalities, partly because majorities can discriminate against minorities, and partly because even with ‘shared’ power at the top, lower level elements may involve inequalities. Inequalities in political power often lead to (and/or stem from) similar inequalities in economic dimensions, biased distribution of government jobs, infrastructure and so on is common with the group in power discriminating in its favour. There are important elements of ‘rational’ choice and costs of conflict to group members who are involved in conflicts. Individual action might be as a result of a calculus of individual or private costs and benefits of action. Of course, especially at times of high tension, group gains or losses also enter individual welfare functions. In some situations, people have been observed to take action which is completely counter to their private interests - as it is usually the case in revolutions or riots; for example, rioters have burned down factories in Sri Lanka where they themselves work, thereby destroying their own employment. Individuals and groups may gain from conflict - e.g. by looting, use of forced labour, changes in the terms of trade in their favour, the creation of new economic opportunities, controlling emergency aid. Keen has analysed such gains in the Sudan and elsewhere (Keen, 1994; 1998).

Policy formulation aimed at preventing, or ending, conflict needs to address the underlying causes systematically. Policy formulation should consider both the issues of horizontal inequality among groups and that of the private incentives to leaders and followers. The government is rarely broad based and normally represents only a subset of the groups potentially involved in conflict. It would often be naive to think that the government even wants to promote peace, given the prevalence of state-instigated violence. The most universal requirement is for political inclusivity because it is monopolisation of political
power by one group or another that is normally responsible for many of the other inequalities. Yet achieving political inclusivity is among the most difficult changes to bring about. It is not just a matter of democracy, defined as rule with the support of the majority, as majority rule can be consistent with abuse of minorities.

In every major conflict there is an interaction between economic, political and cultural factors, with group perceptions and identity (normally historically formed), being enhanced by sharp group differentiation in political participation, economic assets and income
and social access and well-being. Both general analysis and some of the econometric evidence suggests a connection between predisposition to conflict and levels and growth of per capita incomes, although the correlation is not strong. Economic growth would be likely to reduce the propensity to conflict, if it is equitably distributed.

Inequality in income distribution is a summary measure of the incomes/employment dimension but fails to capture, or gives only a partial indicator of, the others. Moreover, income distribution is a vertical measure, i.e. it takes everyone in society from ‘top’ to ‘bottom’ and measures their incomes and the consequent inequality. What is needed for our analysis is a horizontal measure of inequality which measures inequality between groups, where groups are defined by region/ethnicity/class/religion, according to the most
appropriate type of group identification in the particular society. Strong intra-group vertical inequality may actually reduce the potential for inter-group conflict for any given degree of horizontal inequality because it may be more difficult to get group cohesion where there is high intra-group inequality, and because elite members of a group may identify more
with members of the elite from other groups than with lower-income members of their own group.

Equitable and poverty reducing growth would normally be likely to reduce horizontal inequality, and might make persisting inequalities more tolerable. Hence policies that succeed in promoting such growth should form part of any pro-peace policy package. But a great deal of policy analysis has been devoted to delineating the conditions for widely shared growth. Policies include measures to promote human development especially through the spread of education; measures to increase savings and investment; price and technology policies to encourage labour-intensive technologies; new credit institutions to extend credit to the low-income; measures to encourage the informal sector; land reform and support for small farmers; international policies to improve market access and terms of trade and reduce debt burdens.

Many of these policies can be designed specifically to reduce horizontal inequality as well as to promote growth and reduce poverty. For those who had previously been active soldiers (the ‘followers’) preparation for income-earning employment is necessary to reduce conflicts - finance or jobs in works schemes can be offered in exchange for arms, or, where appropriate land or agricultural credit.

Conflict proneness may be identified by the following characteristics: (a) serious past
conflict at some time over the previous twenty years; (b) evidence of a considerable degree of horizontal inequality; (c) low-incomes; and (d) economic stagnation. These are the conditions which predispose to conflict, and statistical work.





References:

Alexander, J., J. McGregor and T. Ranger, forthcoming, 'Ethnicity and the Politics of Conflict: The Case of Matabeleland', in E.W. Nafziger, F. Stewart and R. Väyrynen, (eds), The Origin of Humanitarian Emergencies: War and Displacement in Developing Countries, Oxford: OUP.

Keen, D., 1994, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine relief in
Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keen, D., 1998, ‘The economic functions of civil wars’, Adelphi Paper 320, 1-88, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies.

Stewart, F., Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities; Working Paper Number 33, Oxford University