Factors influencing cooperation

Social motives have been conceptualized as stable individual characteristics. The assumption is that two types of persons – cooperative versus competitive personalities – exist in the world whose dispositions are so stable and their interaction so programmed by these dispositions that, they do not influence each other at the dispositional level, and they do not influence each other’s world views. Although in theory, an infinite number of social motives – sometimes referred to as social value orientations – can be distinguished, a common theoretical classification identifies four major motivational orientations (McClintock, 1972): individualism – the motivation to maximize one’s own gains; 2 competition – the motivation to maximize relative gains, the difference between one’s outcome and that of the other, 3 cooperation - the motivation to maximize joint gain; and 4 altruism – the motivation to maximize other parties’ gains. Individualism and competition motives often are referred to as pro-self motives, whereas cooperation and altruism are referred to as pro-social motives.

In the context of resource dilemmas, consistent findings demonstrate that proself individuals harvest significantly more than people with prosocial motives. Similarly, in scenarios that mirror real life social dilemmas such as traffic congestion, prosocial individuals exhibit a greater preference to commute by public transportation rather than private car, and are more concerned with collective outcomes vis a vis the environment than proself individuals.

What works – assumption provides a clear example of how social motives influence not only choice behavior but also the interpretation of behavior. Liebrand et al (1986) examined the relationship between social motives and interpretations of cooperative and competitive behavior. They found that people with individualist social motives tend to interpret behavior along the what works dimension, whereas cooperators tend to view cooperation and competition as varying on the moral dimension (what is good or bad). Moreover, prosocials view rationality in social dilemmas from the perspective of the collective (community, group level), whereas proself people may view it more from a perspective of individual rationality (egocentrically). Van Lange et al (1990) argued that if one accepts the idea that a perceiver’s own goal or predisposition affects his /her choice and also indicates the perspective (collective or individualistic) taken on rationality, it follows that attributions to intelligence should be determined by the combination of the target’s choice and the subject’s own choice. Thus, social motives may relate not only to differences in choice behavior but also to different perceptions of rationality and intelligence.

In terms of interpretation, findings suggested that cooperators were more likely than rebels to attribute cooperation to intelligence, whereas rebels were more likely than cooperators to attribute noncooperation to intelligence. The findings supported the assumption that prosocial individuals expected more cooperation from an intelligent than an unintelligent person, while competitors expected significantly more cooperative behavior from an unintelligent other than an intelligent one. Hence, social motives influence is evaluated as to how information about others is interpreted. In this experiment, people with different social motives made different interpretations of a ‘common’ dilemma. Impressions of honesty or intelligence, as well as fairness and self interest, fell in line with the might (what works) versus morality (what is good) perspective. Cooperative individuals assigned greater weight to honesty than did individualist and competitive participants, while individualists and competitors placed greater weight on intelligence than prosocial participants. Similarly, Samuelson (1993) found systematic differences between coopertors and noncooperators in the importance they assign to dimensions of fairness and self interest in resource dilemmas. Cooperators assigned greater weight to a fairness dimension, whereas noncooperators assigned greater weight to a self interest dimension.

Another dimension that may relate to social motives is culture. People from collectivist cultures – cultures that view the self as interdependent with others – behave cooperatively with members of their own group and competitively with members of an outgroup, whereas people from individualist cultures – cultures in which the self is perceived as an independent entity – focus less on the social environment and are more task oriented, focusing on their individual goals. However the relationship between culture and social motives is not as straightforward. Cultural values of individualism versus collectivism and social motives are often measured superficially of similar constructs.

Central to popular and psychological understandings of behavior is the notion that behaviors generally are more likely to be exhibited when rewarded, and less likely to be exhibited when punished. The central question in any given situation is what combination or form of rewards and sanctions will yield optimal or desirable results. A number of recent studies have offered new insights that may be applied productively to the development of better commons management techniques. In general people expect to receive more approval if they contribute more, and less approval if others contribute more. The combination of a strong group identity and group interaction results in significantly higher levels of contribution in social affairs. When subjects are strangers or from different social context such as class differences, social approval has a rather weak and insignificant positive effect on participation in collective actions. Yet, if the social distance between subjects is somewhat reduced by allowing some kind of social ties, approval incentives reduces free riding. Group identity effects act as a facilitating lubricant for social exchange. Many real world common dilemmas are related to resources that parties want to last indefinitely, a similar effect is likely to arise when a given party or parties sees an end to their interest in the common dilemmas.

Issues of power and status have long been a subject of focal interest to better understand their role in governing and influencing human behavior. The impact of power and status on the judgments people make about justifications that are offered in a common dilemma are under study. Broad acceptance of a justification can redefine fundamental understandings and rules of behavior. Members of groups with power imbalances are more likely to se the group as competitive, be motivated by individual gains, and retaliate against those who omitted them from a coalition. Power imbalance can be detrimental to group outcomes as it encourages competition and a focus on individual outcomes resulting in less integrative agreements. One of the ways to balance power is to assemble group members from the same social position in the hierarchy who have various sources of expertise that are all necessary to the functioning of the group. This way, although the group members would still have their own interests and goals, they might not be as threatened or put off by the positions of other group members.

Also related to the study of coalitions and power distribution is research on voting institutions. Walker et al. (2000) found that voting substantially increases the efficiency of the outcomes in commons dilemma games. Voting can act as communication signal when no communication is possible. The very act of making a proposal and voting on a set of proposals signals limited information to all involved. In particular, it appears to generate information that enables a learning process to occur. This learning extends to subsequent situations and enables people to coordinate their activities even in rounds where no proposals are made.

In a common dilemma people confronted with lack of resources willingly endow authorities with additional control over the resources. The legitimacy of such authorities is determined by the authorities’ commitment to fair allocation and decision making procedures. People’ social identifications with their community moderate the relationship between authorities’ use of fair procedures and the support of the authorities. Those who feel pride in their community and perceived procedures to be fair express particular support for the regulating authorities. People who took pride in their community care even less about their personal outcomes. Tyler and Degoey (1995) suggest that authorities’ effectiveness is primarily linked to the nature of their social bonds with community members. Social identification with community is an important variable that should not be overlooked in future studies of resource dilemmas.

On the other hand, a question has sparked opposing theoretical perspectives whether socioeconomic heterogeneity leads to cooperation or hinders it. The focus on economic heterogeneity in studies of locally managed social issues find support for the fact that heterogeneity hinders cooperation. All types of heterogeneity such as social, ethnic, and cultural differences similarly affect the cooperation and play an important role.

Humanitarian Emergency Response: food aid

Humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of assessed needs and the principles of humanity criterion to prevent and alleviate human suffering, protecting and respecting the life, health and dignity of each individual. Maintaining neutrality and providing aid solely to non combatants is crucial in emergency responses. There should be no discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion which makes the relief initiation to be guided solely by needs.

Particular efforts must be made to ensure that food aid to reach and benefits the neediest. Assistance is to be provided on the basis of assessments of needs. Priority should be given to those who most need food. Nutritional emergency aid should seek to secure safe and unimpeded access to vulnerable people and areas for assessment, delivery, distribution and monitoring of food aid. With respect to securing self reliance the aim is that the type, scale, timing and manner of food aid delivery supports livelihoods, reduces vulnerability to future food scarcities and supports durable solutions. Food aid should not undermine local agricultural production, marketing or coping mechanisms, nor should it disturb normal migratory patterns or foster dependency. Beneficiaries should be involved, whenever possible, in the design and implementation of food aid programs that best address their needs and there should be meaningful participation. People should be helped to remain in their home areas whenever possible. Families and households should be permitted to function normally, particularly in food preparation and eating. Women must be consulted and should participate fully in all decisions concerning the planning and management of food distribution. Women should be fully informed about ration levels and ration cards should be issued in their name. relief food should be provided directly to women wherever possible, taking account of security risks in particular as the best way of ensuring that family food requirements are met. Food aid should be part of a coherent, comprehensive assistance package that is designed to address the overall needs of beneficiaries. it must work within the framework of established UN coordination mechanisms and with the government, donors and NGOs to ensure effective coordination. Delivery and distribution systems should be planned and implemented in ways that take staff, partner and beneficiary security into account. Adequate systems and plans should be in place to facilitate quick response to any crisis in order to save lives and prevent distress migration.

For attending to the special needs of vulnerable groups, it is essential to take account of the new roles that women may have taken on as a result of the crisis and the particular challenges they face in receiving emergency rations and meeting the food needs of their families. Programs should be designed to ensure women’s full information about entitlements and their full participation in decision making groups, and to facilitate their equal access to resources, employment, markets and trade. Children’s special needs should also be taken into account. They are entitled to special protection, opportunities and facilities that enable them to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in conditions of freedom and dignity. Support must be given to measure that help to assure their social and psychological needs while providing food aid to meet children’s nutritional needs.

In terms of internally displaced persons IDPs the aim should be to recognize and understand their particular situation and needs of food insecurity. While providing food aid to help IDPs meet their food needs and reestablish normal, or new, livelihoods and coping mechanisms, give support also to measures that help to assure them the same rights and freedoms as other persons in their country. Food aid program should work closely with refugee relief agencies to address the food needs of refugees and to support food related activities aimed at building their self reliance.

Assessing the Situation

Assessment must determine, whether external emergency assistance is needed and if so, whether food aid would be appropriate. By whom, how and through what mechanisms it should be provided and targeted, taking account of the available capacities for implementation, as well as any practical constraints.

Assessment estimates the total emergency food needs of the identified target populations. Unmet needs are then determined taking account of the food supply situation in the country as a whole and other possible sources of food assistance.

Assessment of the food situation and food aid needs is usually undertaken jointly with appropriate partners, refugees, and other populations.

Basic questions to be answered by an assessment – is food aid needed?
How has the crisis affected people’s ability to purchase/grow/gather/receive food or earn cash? Are some people unable to provide enough food for themselves and their families as a result of the crisis?

Why are people food-insecure? Is it because of an absolute shortage of food in the area, a lack of purchasing power, and/or social discrimination?

If there are abnormal levels of acute malnutrition, are the causes: inadequate food, inequitable food availability, poor feeding practices, and /or disease?

How is the food supply and nutrition situation likely to evolve in the coming weeks and months?

Would food aid be an appropriate response to some or all of the problems/needs?

FOR WHOM? WHERE?WHAT?HOW MUCH? WHEN? And HOW?


Source: WFP Emergency Field Operations

Efficient Energy Use

Energy affects nearly every aspect of our lives. fossil fuels and electricity appear to be plentiful, less expensive, and readily available. Ignoring taxes, a gallon of gasoline doesnt cost much more expensive than a gallon of bottled water. we turn on our appliances and lights with the flip of a switch, giving little tought to how the electricity is generated, or the consequences of its generation. Energy produces affect governments and the world economy in large scale. World wide energy use has increased 4 fold since 1950. This dramatic increase in energy use enabled economic growth and higher standards of living for a sizable fraction. Following WWII petroleum production rapidly accelerted. Use of natural gas and nuclear power both grew rapidly during the past 30 years. Fossil fuel provide about 80% of the global energy supply today. Among fossil fuels, petroleum provides the largest share and accounts for about 35% of the total global energy supply. Coal provides about 23% and natural gas about 21%. Of the total renewable energy sources account for about 14% of the global energy supply, but most of this is in the form of traditional energy sources. Modern renewable energy sources, including hydropower, wind power, and modern forms of bio energy, account for only about one third of the renewable energy total, nuclear energy provides the remaining 6% of the global energy supply (UNDP 2000).

About one third of the world's population 2 billion people - still rely almost entirely on fire wood and other traditional energy sources for their energy needs. these households do not consume electricity petroleum products, or natural gas - a major factor contributing to their impoverishment.

Business as usual forecasts project that global energy use will increase around 2 percent per year in the coming decades. For example, the 2000 World Energy Outlook produced by the International Energy Agency projects in its Reference Scenario that world energy demand will increase by 54% between 1997 and 2020. Oil use would increase by 56%, natural gas use by 86% and coal use by 49 % in this forecast. Fossil fuels would account for nearly 84 percent of total primary energy supply in 2020, up from their 80 % share in 1997. Use of traditional fuels in developing nations would continue to increase, but more slowly than the projected growth in fossil fuel use. Expanding investment in energy supply and conversion is feasible in some countries, but will be difficult in transition and developing nations. These countries need to invest in a broad range of priorities including education, sanitation, health care and rural development. Energy costs are heavier on the individual level in developing and transition countries. Households in developing countries often pay a sizable portion of their income for energy including batteries and fuels and often use these energy sources very 'inefficiently'.

In Ukraine, for example, energy costs account for as much as 40 percent of household expenditures. Environmental contamination can be especially bad in regions with high levels of energy production. Kazakhstan, for example, is a major producer of oil and natural gas, coal, and uranium. But it also has severe air pollution. Soil contamination, and pollution of both surface and ground water. Pollution has severely affected the Caspian Sea and its ecosystems. Khazkhstan faces a public health and ecological crisis due to energy related pollution.

As bad as outdoor air pollution is in many developing countries, indoor air pollution from burning fuelwood and agricultural residues for cooking and heating is an even greater health hazard. In South Africa, rural households that burn wood for cooking and heating exhibit indoor particulate levels 13 times the maximum level recommended by the WHO. According to the WHO and other experts, indoor air pollution is causing about 1.8 million premature deaths annually mainly in women and children (WHO 1997). Fossil fuel intensive energy development over the next century could exacerbate these air quality problems, adversely affecting economic output as well as public health. Nearly half the world’s population lives in rural areas of developing countries, and most of these people do not use electricity or modern cooking fuels. In India for example less than 30 percent of rural households use electricity, over 90 percent use traditional biomass cooking fuels. In many African nations, less than 20 percent of the population has access to electricity (Balu 1997). While hundreds of millions of rural households in developing countries began using electricity and improved their cooking methods between 1970 and 1990, about 2 billion people were without access to electricity or improved cooking methods in 1990 .

Sustainable energy development should provide adequate energy services for satisfying basic human needs, improving social welfare, and achieving economic development throughout the world. But sustainable energy future is only possible through much greater energy efficiency and much greater reliance on renewable energy sources compared to current energy patterns and trends. Greater energy efficiency would reduce growth in energy consumption, decrease investment requirements, and improve energy services in poorer households and nations.

Organization for Economic Coopertion and Development OECD nations are expected to increase their oil import dependence from 54 percent in 1997 to 70 percent in 2020 if current trends are maintained. Also, Asian nations are expected to greatly increase their dependence on imported oil over the next 20 years. The share of world oil supply coming from OPEC nations in the Persian Gulf region increases from 26 percent in 1997 to 41 percent in 2020 in the 2000 World Energy Outlook Reference scenario forecast.

The progress made in reducing overall energy intensity use in eight major OECD countries since 1973 projects a decline of 43 percent in the US, 39 percent in the UK, 24 percent in Japan and 43 percent in Germany. Structural changes such as the shift in economic output from heavy industries to light industries and the services sector caused some of these reductions, but much of the decline was due to real energy efficiency gains (Schipper et al 2001).

Far greater energy savings could be achieved through widespread adoption of commercially available and cost effective energy efficient technologies such as:
- more efficient cooking and water heat8ing devices
- buildings that make better use of natural li8ghting and ventilation
- building that have reflective roofs to reduce their air conditioning load
- compact fluorescent lamps replacing incandescent lamps
- other energy efficient lighting devices
- refrigeration equipment with more efficient compressors and better heat exchangers
- energy management and control systems
- electronic devices with low standby power consumption
- improved design and control of pumping, compressed air, and other motor systems and
- more efficient vehicle engines and drivetrains, lighter weight vehicles, and hybrid electric vehicles.

These are just some of the technologies that can lower the amount of energy consumed for a given task. There are many other options for reducing energy use in applications ranging from washing clothes to operating electronic equipment to manufacturing steel, chemicals, and other basic materials. In addition more intelligent design of new homes, office buildings vehicles, and industrial processes through an integrated systems engineering approach can provide substantial energy savings often with first cost savings as well.


Population growth and life style choice


Many social and cultural developments will affect future energy resources and consumption levels, and consequently the difficulty of achieving a clean energy movement during this century. Population growth and life style choices are two important factors in this regard. Although these factors are normally taken as a given in energy policy analysis, policies to limit population growth world wide and encourage less consumptive life styles could help to facilitate a clean energy mobilization. The world’s population is expected to increase about 50% by 2050 under medium growth assumptions, with almost all the increase expected in developing countries . But population growth could be held to 35 percent during this period if efforts to lower fertility are stepped up. Reducing population growth will facilitate a transition to a substantial future by reducing consumption of energy and other resources. At the same time providing modern energy sources to households now lacking electricity and modern fuels will improve standards of living and help to reduce population growth in developing countries (Reddy 2000). Other policies that can reduce population growth include better health care and education especially of women, expanding family planning services and efforts to convince couples to limit the number of children they have UNFPA 2001. lifestyle affects energy consumption through many choices such as the types of appliances, home, and vehicles families purchase, how they are used, and size, energy consuming devices are proliferating. Personal vehicles that are large and powerful as well as urban sprawl has been continued in many cities. This has caused the growth effect to outstrip the efficiency effect, leading to rising energy consumption and CO2 emissions, in spite of high rates of energy efficiency improvement.

Energy related activities, mainly burning of fossil fuels, produce about 78 percent of humanmade carbon dioxide emissions and about 23 percent of humanmade methane emissions (Holdren and Smith 2000). Carbon dioxide and methane are responsible for about 80 percent of the warming that has occurred since preindustrial times due to emissions of long lived gases. Global warming is starting to have a variety of adverse impacts. These include more frequent and extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, and heat waves, which in turn cause death, property damage, and crop loss. Worldwide economic losses due to extreme weather events increased 10 folds from about $4 billion per year during the 1950s to about $40 billion per year during the 1990s . Global warming also raised the sea level, which adversely affects lowlying island nations and costal areas. If current energy supply and demand trends continue, dramatic global warming will occur during the twenty first century. Worldwide carbon dioxide emissions would increase by a factor of 2 to 2.5 by 2050.

Personal choices can have a significant effect on the total consumption of energy and the rate of energy demand growth. Combating the desire for more consumption of material goods and a bigger is better mentality could play a role in a clean energy outlook. Changing life style choices on a large scale is not simple or easy. Many institutions ranging from business interests, advertising, and popular culture (TV, film, etc) promote consumptive oriented, bigger is better lifestyles. In the US for example a sizable fraction of the public espouses concern for the environment but relatively few people have modified their behaviour or life style in ways that are consistent with these views. Educational efforts, use of role models, as well as more conventional policies such as taxes and financial incentives can influence behavior and life style. At the same time more research is needed concerning the most effective ways to change values and promote lifestyle choices that are more efficient in terms of consumption and more consistent with a sustainable future.

The task of civility

Urban living calls for a rather special and quite sophisticated type of skills, a whole family of skills of civility that is the activity which protects people from each other and yet allow them to enjoy each other's company. Pure sociability is detached from the circumstances of power malaise and private feeling stances. Civility has as its aim the shielding of others from being burdened with oneself. This aim is pursued in the hope of reciprocation. Shielding others from being burdened by intereference . Of course, civility like language can not be private. But civility of one town is a feature of its social setting that is learned and practiced. Civility is the urban environment which must be civil, if its inhabitants are to learn the difficult skills of civility. Where society is rolling toward degeneration, and preoccupied with mere trivialities - people remain stagnant.

Political development prospects of CIS countries

Political development prospects of CIS

All member countries of the CIS have several features in common: underdeveloped and inefficient political structures, serious problems in the sphere of human rights and high levels of corruption in government organizations. These factors may bring about social explosions, which if supported from the outside, may turn into a revolutionary situation.

In Kazakhstan, a powerful administrative resource guaranteed a victory for Nazabayev. At the elections, he ran against a strong rival for the first time, ex speaker of the lower chamber of parliament Zharmakhan Tuyakbai. The opposition has gained vast organization and political experience, together with a ramified structure. In 2004, Soros Foundation Kazakhstan launched several projects in the country, among them pre election distance, and a project for strengthening and developing Kazakh NGOs that work to protect mass media and journalists. The US also exerts pressure on the Kazakh leadership by raising the human rights issue and spreading information discrediting members of the Kazakh leader’s team. For example, a hearing held in Jan 2005 called Kazakhgate involved high ranking officials accused of corruption.

The situation in Tajikstan is relatively stable. The authorities continue to keep the situation under control, while the legal opposition has to abide, at least outwardly, by the rules of the game. No viable opponent has emerged to challenge the current president, Rakhmonov, but inside his clan there is agitation and regrouping of forces. Tensions have been growing in Tajik society, as acute social and economic problems remain unsolved amidst the criminal enrichment of the ruling clan. NGOs are engaged in active propaganda activities, organizing seminars and discussions and distributin teaching aids on suffrage.

In Turkmenistan despite serious economic problems and grave financial position of an overwhelming majority of the population there are no leaders capable of challenging Saparmurat Niazov – even with outside support. Opposition organisations and mass media are forbidden in the country. The government does not allow an extensive presence of foreign NGOs in the country. Those organizations that do work in Turkmenistan are not permitted to go beyond the frameworks of local projects pertaining to education, public health services and the support of small and medium businesses. The parliamentary elections on 2004 showed that the west has no levers of influence on election processes in Turkmenistan. International organizations including the OSCE were not allowed to observe the course of the election and the vote counting.

In Uzbekistan, where social tensions have been growing one can still speak of a certain threshold of public patience. In 2003-4 it passed new laws that have essentially changed t he conditions for the presence of foreign NGOs in the country. The new laws have toughned procedures for NGO registration and banned financial and other aid for political parties.

The European union views central Asia as a buffer zone against terrorism, Islamic extremism, drug trafficking and illegal migration. The EU’s policy toward central Asia is determined by the Union’s strategy paper for central Asia for 2002-2006, which states that the regional countries face common development problems, caused mainly by a slow transition to democracy, lagging implementation of market oriented economic reforms, and Islamic radicalisation. Since Sept 11, 2001, the European Union has doubled its financial assistance. The core objective of the EU strategy is to promote the stability and security of the Central Asian countries and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction. To achieve this goa, funds are allocated under the TACIS (technical aid to the commonwealth of independent states) program. Between 1991 and 2004, EU assistance to central asia amounted to 1,132 million euros; of this amount, 516 million euro from TACIS were used for technical assistance. The remainder of the money was used for humanitarian aid and macro financial loans and grants.

The European union is gradually becoming a major donor country, thereby contributing to the strengthening of the Tajik-Afghan border. The EU is implementing its Border Management Program for Central Asia BOMCA, for which it was to allocate 3.9 million in 2005. in the first half of 2005 Brussels allocated 1.65 euro million in technical aid to Tajikistan’s Border Guard Committee; Britain pledged to give another 1.5 million euro.

Energy is acquiring great importance in EU relations with central asia. The European union is very interested in the development of cooperation with Kazakhstan in the fuel sector energy resources account for 75% of EU imports from Kazakhstan. Brussels wants Astana to introduce stable, transparent and non discriminatory legislation that would enable European companies to operate in that country in an effective way.

The European Union welcomed the outcome of the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan in July 2005, and noted that the pre requisites are in place for continued stabilization there. As regards Uzbekistan, the EU general affairs and external relations council in Oct 2005 introduced sanctions against the capital fo Tashkent and criticized excessive use of force in Andizhan. The European Commission has reoriented its work in Uzbekistan under the TACIS program to support increased focus on the needs of the population, democracy and human rights, as well as to foster closer links with Uzbek civil society. Unlike the US the EU countries recognize Russia’s strategic interests in the region and are ready to discuss them. At the same time, they are prepared to implement practical interaction in addressing security problems above the drug threat, as well as develop the energy sector.

Beijing views the penetration of outside countries in central Asia, above all the US as aggravating economic competition in the region and as attempts to contain China militarily, politically and economically. In is relations with Russia, Chinese diplomacy recognizes the traditional political and economic interests of their northern neighbour and its leading role in regional security. China whose economy has a growing need for energy resources, is working hard to enter the central Asian energy markets. Through its participation, china seeks to prevent the redistribution of the regional markets of raw materials. Chinese companies participate in the development of the Aktyubinsk and Mangyshlak oil fields – the Aktyubink petrochemical plant is a Kazakh-Chinese joint venture, in which China owns 85 %, and are also showing an interest in oil prospecting in Kyrgyzstan. Beijing continues display political activity at bilateral and multilateral levels. In 1996, china signed a multilateral agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrzstan and Tajikstan on confidence building measures concerning border patrols. A year later this pact was followed up with an agreement on mutual reductions of armed forces in the border areas. In 2002, China concluded treaties with Kyrgysztan and Kazakhstan on strengthening relations, friendship and cooperation, similar to the 2001 Russian-Chinese Treaty.

Beijing views the Shanghai cooperation Organisation as an instrument for strengthening regional security and developing multilateral cooperation. China’s active policy in the region is dictated by the need to establish interaction with neighboring countries to counter Uygur separatism, as well as to prevent outside support for separatist forces operating in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. These forces seek to create the so called state of East Turkestan on Chinese territory and the neighbouring central Asian countries to counter the separatists, Chinese special services are strengthening cooperation with colleagues in Russia, Kazakhstan and other countries throughout central Asia.


The North Caucasus

Terrorist sorties, unparalleled in audacity and scale, have acquired a tenacity and regularity in the North Caucasus. Events that were at one time confined to Chechnya are now found all across the region. These events seem to have formed a systemic process with deep lying sources of reproduction. Destabilizing factors in the North Caucasus are intertwined in a complicated and chaotic way, often making it hard to identify the primary and secondary, as well as the logical and haphazard, elements.

Since 1991 Russia has been slowly but surely losing sovereignty over the North Caucasus. The region is de facto pulling out of the legislative framework of the Russian Federation along two synchronized directions, which can be described as sporadic and deliberate. The sporadic element of this highly explosive evolution springs from the realities of everyday existence that dissuade the population from observing Russian legislation. As those individuals holding the reins of power ‘privatize’ federal law, they recklessly tear the regions entrusted to them out of the framework of Russian statehood, while inflicting moral damage on the country’s image and reputation in the eyes of its compatriots, not to mention the international community.

It has become customary to describe the North Caucasian crisis as systemic. Moscow’s interpretation of system argues that factors generating the crisis are positioned in a horizontal relationship and play more or less equally destructive roles. Unlike Russian intellectuals, the bureaucrats are aware of their goal and how to get there. However as esoteric knowledge aims to undermine the welfare of the people, the answer is to build a system capable of changing the policies of the force and talents of politicians and administrators. The population not particularly endorsing state power, but it has a much greater dislike for the absence of power; this situation brings to a head the problem of the balance between freedom and security. These two notions in North Caucasian society resemble a system of communicating vessels to a greater degree than anywhere else. Public opinion in the region is not simply loyal to the idea of strengthening the vertical structure of state power. It demands more pragmatic policies. Following the collaps of the soviet union, which removed Russia’s supra identity of a strong power, the masses of the region population adopted ethnic, clan, corporate and other highly marginalized forms of self identification as replacements for it. The paradox of globaization in that region is that its peoples have chosen the path of restoring traditionalist patriarchal relations dating from the 17th and 18th centuries. These presuppose clan hierarchy, infighting among clans for top positions on the hierarchic ladder, a system of subordination, and the practice of subservience tributes with a respective distribution of community wealth and important roles. Moreover the cover-ups and notions of crime and punishment, implemented through the sporadic revival of common law have also aggravated the situation. These circumstances make it highly impractical to hold out hope for the self organization of the North Caucasian regions along the principles of civic society’s dictum from the bottom to the top, a general pattern of social relations.

The English philosopher William of Ockham warned that entities must not be multiplied beyond what is necessary. His call is especially topical in the North Caucasus where entities have multiplied beyond their capacities. If the situation is not made simpler with the implantation from above, it will become too complex at the bottom. The spaces of the region abound in knots, which require courage, and the sources to draw are present.

Derived from:
Degoyev V., Ibragimov R., The north Caucasus and the future of Russian Statehood, in Russian in global affair quarterly, Dec 2005

Chernyavsky S., Central Asia in an Era of Change, in Russian in global affair quarterly, Dec 2005

Risk Assessment

Does behavior that does not maximize the odds of survival illustrate the limits of human rationality, and if so, how should we proceed once we admit that individuals do not correctly react to many risks? Whether individuals correctly or rationally react to risks is clouded by many factors characterizing risk situations in addition to the odds of survival, for instance, whether the risk is taken voluntarily, whether it is controllable, and so forth. Yet even distracting from these contextual factors, the question of rational choice is not clear.

Are policy makers make decision on risk management according to how many people are concerned rather than how many people are affected? Risk choices involve life and death, and therefore inconsistency and misperceptions should not be tolerated a basis for public policy. How much more society wishes to spend to avoid catastrophic risks, or how far our social decision makers should stray from the lives saved objective, will depend on how these weights are determined. As an alternative to expert decided weights, the economist’s welfarist model dictates that the valuation depends on how much the affected individuals wish to spend. Ultimately, this means that the lives saved principle is replaced by one of citizen preference. There is a growing literature in socity that risks and the scientific discourse surrounding environmental risk issues are to an important extent socially constructed. Numerous case studies show that organized interest groups interpret the evidence on risk differently producing biased science, such as in environment issues. However it is also argued that interests are themselves grounded in social context, for example individuals choose what to fear in order to support their way of life and give more or less attentions to risk according to world views that entail deeply held values and benefits. According to research by Wildavsky and Dake, these social relations can predict risk taking preferences better than measures of knowledge of the probabilities and outcomes.

The value rule was entered into judicial interpretations of Tort Law as early as the 1920s by Judge Learned Haud, who gave the standard for negligent conduct a simple mathematical interpretation; risk is expressed as the product of probability times consequences.

The important point is that, following economic logic, policy makers can justify substantial deviations from the lives saved objective if they are based on the public’s concerns about the risk situation. Policy makers should be accountable for large disparities in public risk reducing expenditure. For well informed stakeholders even seemingly irrational or unreasonable concerns should not be dismissed as illegitimate.

Hence, as expressed by Slovic, although individuals tend to misjudge probabilities, their conceptualisation of risk is often much broader and richer than the expert’s reliance on quantitative estimates. People display extreme preferences for avoiding collective deaths, for example for reducing their risk of flying as opposed to their risk of driving.

Ref: Zeckhauser, R.J., Keeney R.L., Sebenius J.K., 1996, Wise Choices, Harvard Business Schoold Press

Wildavsky A., Dake K., ‘Theories of Risk Perception’

Economics of Environment

Destruction of environment takes place through using wrong criteria to determine production structures, through distorted consumer patterns, a waste of material resources, lack of recycling and unattributed dumping of waste products into environment.

Many peole believe that there are intrinsic values in environmetal assets. They are of value in themselves and are not of human beings, values that exist not just because individual human beings have prefernce for them. Economic valuation is essentially about discovering the demand curve for environmental goods and services: the values which human beings place on the environment. The use of money is a way that people express their preferences. Though their willingness to pay for the process of making public choices. Both values are legitimate, hence, both are relevant to decision making. Environmental assets such as tropical rain forests, ecologically precious wetlands, and endangered species have intrinsic value. The environment assets often are viewed as a luxury to be afforded later, not while the struggle for poverty alleviation is under way. Bringing discussion of rights and intrinsic values into policy dialogue appeared until today as forgoing the benefits of development. However, as resources are becoming more scarce conservation and the sustainable use of resources have become of important ‘economic value’, and of potential complements. Therefore, there is awareness raising issues to demonstrate and measure the economic value of environmental assets. Decisions are likely to be biased in favour of short term benefits because conservation benefits are not readily calculable. Unless incentives are devised whereby the non market benefits are internalised into the land use choice mechanism, conservation benefits will automatically be down graded.

Environmental damages generates costs which are not currently recorded as part of GNP, but which would be if GNP accounts were modified to reflect comprehensive measures of aggregate well being rather than economic activity. However GNP, will be affected if environment damages were avoided. Evidences are compelling that environment degradation results in appreciable losses of GNP. Soil erosion and air pollution affecting crop and forestry, health and productivity accelerates increase of damages done by pollution. Previously since environment damage cost did not show up explicitly in measures of national product, planners had no incentive to treat environmental damage as a priority in development plans. As the GNP costs of degradation are escalating and becoming substantial, environment has been entered into development plans.

Ref:
Brown R.L., 1993, State of the World, Worldwatch Institute, published in the UK by Unwin Hyman

Pearce D., 1997, Economic values and the natural world, Earthscan

Nell J.E., 1996, Making sense of a changing economy, Routledge

Critical responses to homogenization of ethnic analysis: the 1991 Census ethnic group categories

In Britain the most pervasive ethnicity categorisation of contemporary quantitative research is that of the 1991 census, developed through a considerable exercise in coding and categorising textual responses to questions on subjective ethnic identity (Bulmer 1996, Sillitoe & White 1992). The census schema’s attraction lies in its apparent ability to produce a parsimonious and theoretically coherent account of ethnic difference. Thus on the one hand it produces a demographic map showing a handful of large, discrete and putatively homogeneous ethnic groups, principally identified with historically different waves of immigration (Peach 1997). On the other, it makes reference to a “popular” discourse on the meaning of ethnicity, namely individuals’ ethnic identities, derived from the contextual fusion of elements such as identification with country of ancestors’ origins, skin colour, language, shared cultural values, shared participation in the social conditions of a group, and religion (cf Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1992, Banton 1997, Mason 1995). The resulting categories reflect a trend of “origins-privilege” in British conceptualisations of ethnicity. For instance, a common pattern in sociological discussions mimics the development of the census categorisations : a conception of subjective ethnic identification, which is in theory unconstrained, is eventually (and often begrudgingly, cf Anthias 1998), whittled down to a discussion in terms of categories heavily coincident with the history of immigration to Britain (Mason 1995, Modood et al 1997, Solomos 1993)3. Subsequently, the categories of the 1991 census have come to dominate the terms of contemporary social research, been replicated in both government and private surveys, and adopted in the monitoring systems of major institutions (Coleman & Salt 1996a). Table 1 below shows the ‘ethnic map’ of Britain produced by the 1991 census categories.


Table 1
The UK population categorised by selected ethnic groupings
(numbers or estimated numbers in millions)
1991 Census Religion 2001 Census
White (51.9) Christian / none / other (53.1) White-British
Black-Caribbean (0.50) Muslim (1.05) White-Irish
Black-African (0.21) Hindu (0.39) White-Other
Black-Other (0.18) Sikh (0.34) Mixed White/Black-Caribbean
Indian (0.84) Mixed White/Black-African
Pakistani (0.48) Indian Sub-Division Mixed White/Asian
Bangladeshi (0.16) Indian sub-continent (0.50) Mixed Other
Chinese (0.16) African-Asian (0.34) Black-Caribbean
Other Asian (0.20) Black-African
Other Other (0.29) Black-Other
Languages spoken
Indian
English / Celtic only
(52.6) Pakistani
Immigrant Status
Non-European
(2.3) Bangladeshi
Born in UK (51.1)
Other Asian Born abroad (3.7)
Chinese
Any other


Sources :
· 1991 Census and Immigrant Status : Coleman and Salt (1996b:134)
· Religion, Language and Indian Sub-Division : approximations derived from Modood et al (1997:298,309) (1994 PSI survey) compared against 1991 Census proportions4



However, a number of critical perspectives can be presented on the 1991 census
categorisations, which when combined leave limited theoretical support to justify their considerable research influence.

Initially, several positions are theoretically congruent with the census categorisations 5, but find inadequacies in their practical implementation. Firstly, pragmatic support for the style of operationalisation has been countered with the claim that the categories are badly chosen, and moreover will be increasingly inappropriate over time (eg Owen 1996) – an influential argument which resulted in modifications made to the schema for the 2001 Census (UK Command Papers 1999, and see table 1.1). Whilst some such positions advocate the mere adjustment of the appropriate category labels, a more fundamental critique anticipates that social, cultural and demographic trends in Britain mean that the census categories’ Weberian conflation of ‘origins’ with ‘identities’ is rapidly loosing purchase over time (Berthoud 1998a).

A second, related, critical position holds that the 1991 census categories give an inappropriate weight to multiple alternative (but measurable) ethnic referents, such as those shown in table 1.1. Whilst the 1991 census categories broadly coincide with many of these boundaries, it may be plausible to claim that specific applications require a stronger focus upon alternative referents6, or perhaps their combination with subjective ethnic identity categories. Certainly, the incorporation of categories cross-classifying referents such as subjective identity, language, religion and country of birth may not be as complex for Britain as may be expected, since there is a considerable degree of clustering into categories.

One important point, however, concerns the subsequent confusion caused if different research traditions favour the use of alternative or combined ethnicity referents. This is aptly illustrated in attempts at cross-nationally comparative discussions of ethnicity effects, where the common solution of making do with which ever referents are nationally available (Lambert & Penn 2001, Stille 1999), causes confusion and cynicism over the strength of comparative conclusions (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2000, Lloyd 1995).


1 This paper is constructed primarily from results presented in Lambert (2002), which discusses many of the findings presented here in greater detail.

2 We concentrate here upon the example of Britain, but even a cursory review of the social science research situations of other countries reveals similar confrontations are widespread (cf Alund & Granqvist 1995, with Stille 1999).

3 In some cross-nationally comparative research a similar neo-Weberian conception of ethnicity is advocated, as in the concept of country specific “ethno-national identities” used in the works in Martiniello (1995). Panayi’s (1999) study reflects how, as in Britain, most such derived categories ultimately reflect patterns of ancestral origins.



4 The information on ‘language spoken’ estimates those with the ability to speak a non-European language, not those who necessarily speak such a language regularly. The study by Modood et al (1997) does not cover all relevant census categories, prompting working approximations based upon the descriptive evidence of Peach (1997). Thus we treated the Black-Other group with the same proportions as the Black-Caribbean groups. It is also estimated that 50% of the Black-African, Other-
Asian and Other-Other populations followed ‘Christian / none / other’ religions, and the other 50% were Muslim; and that 90% of the members of all of those groups could speak a non-European language.

5 In their support of the principal that subjective ethnic identity could adequately summarise the constellation of ethnic elements mentioned above, these positions could be described as Weberian, cf Banton (1997).

6 For instance, although Modood is generally a proponent of the maximum number of subjective ethnic categorisations (Modood et al 1994, Modood et al 1997), in one significant article he suggests distinguishing Asian groups solely between Muslim and non-Muslim for the analysis of economic attainment (Modood 1991).

Derived from:
Lambert, P., 2002,“Quantitative Representations of Ethnic Difference?”
The University of Oxford;
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/rc28/Papers/lambert.pdf

OXFAM: Violence against women and trafficking

Violence against women is probably the most serious barrier to women’s participation in public life and to a livelihood.

It affects both rich and poor women, from any race, in any country in the world. Whether we are talking about violence or the threat of violence in the home, in the community or in the streets, actual violence or the threat of violence prevents women from participating in society. Living a life governed by fear means women are often unable to hold down a job, move about freely, and make choices about their lives. Every week two women are killed as a result of domestic violence in the UK.

Violence against women is the campaigning issue for women in any country in the world, and Oxfam has an international programme aimed at ending this violence. This consists of a variety of interventions – from providing safe houses for women fleeing violence, to lobbying government for better legislation to prevent it, and to ensure resources for implementation. It has also launched a campaign in South Asia which focuses on the ideas and beliefs which perpetuate violence against women as well as improving practice in addressing the problem.

Work on these ideas and beliefs is essential in the UK too – opinion surveys still tell us that many people, both men and women, believe that there are circumstances when women “deserve” violence as punishment. We need to explore what people would need to hear, see, and feel to change their views. This will help to identify campaign positioning and messages.

This is not to say, of course, that men do not suffer violence, but the extent of violence against women is such a serious barrier to a safe and productive life that Oxfam is focusing on this area particularly.

Trafficking of human beings has become a global criminal phenomenon and millions of people are being caught up in this destructive web of fear and violence. According to UN statistics, the vast majority of victims are women and children who are lured, abducted, sold or coerced into forced prostitution and bonded labour.

UN figures suggest that 200,000 to 300,000 women are trafficked to Europe every year. The cost of communications is now so low that prostitution, which used to be limited by tradition and custom, has become a global market – as has pornography.


Oxfam GB, www.oxfam.org.uk



VITAL VOICES TRAFFICKING ALERT:

Vital Voices begins 2006 with many exciting anti-trafficking activities. Recently, Vital Voices joined the international business community in Athens, Greece to create a strong alliance against human trafficking, especially in women and children. In attendance were businesses from the tourism, shipping, hospitality, telecommunication, job placement, law, IT and banking industries. The roundtable participants proved their commitment to anti-trafficking efforts by signing on to the Ethical Principles. The signatories also pledged to declare a zero tolerance policy against trafficking, develop a corporate anti-trafficking strategy, to encourage business partners, including suppliers, to combat human trafficking, and to monitor and ensure the implementation of the Ethical Principles.

On January 23, 2006, the international business community convened in the birth city of democracy, Athens, Greece, to form an alliance against human trafficking, especially in women and children, by signing onto the Ethical Principles. The Ethical Principles bind corporate signatories to: declare a zero tolerance policy against trafficking; develop a corporate anti-trafficking strategy; encourage business partners, including suppliers, to combat human trafficking; and to monitor and ensure the implementation of the Ethical Principles. The Ethical Principles were later announced at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.



Represented business sectors included tourism, shipping, hospitality, telecommunication, job placement, law, IT, and banking industries. From CEOs to senior corporate officers, all business representatives were aware of the exploitation of all human beings for both labor and sexual exploitation, and are determined to fight it. The full-day discussion focused on specific measures and concrete actions that should be undertaken by the business sector, such as raising awareness through distribution of materials, creating job opportunities, assisting law enforcement investigations, reporting probable trafficking cases to the authorities, as well as advocating for better government anti-trafficking policies and additional resources to strengthen law enforcement and civil society capacities.

The roundtable was organized by the Suzanne Mubarak Women International Peace Movement and the Global Coalition Women Defending Peace and was attended by approximately 150 representatives from businesses, NGOs, and inter-governmental organizations. Dignitaries attending the roundtable included: Mrs. Suzanne Mubarak, First Lady of Egypt, Queen Silvia of Sweden, Queen Shaikah of Bahrain, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary General, as well as Mrs. Marianna Vardinoyannis, UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador and host of the roundtable in Greece.



"Our major task is to raise awareness of the magnitude of the problem. I, personally, was not aware of it," admitted Egypt's first lady, Suzanne Mubarak. "This really is a global tragedy, it needs global solutions and it needs global ideas, getting more people like the business community on board and more people committed," said Mubarak.



Vital Voices Chair of the Board, Ms. Melanne Verveer, led the discussion on Ethical Principles in the afternoon. "Throughout the world, more government and NGO partnerships have been established in the war against human trafficking. It is our hope that the newly formed public-private partnership will lead to a much greater impact. The traffickers are organized and we must be united," remarked Ms. Verveer.

Anti-Trafficking experts from inter-governmental organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNESCO), the United Nations Women's Fund, (UNIFM), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Interpol, and the World Bank all presented various perspectives of human trafficking, as a labor and sexual exploitation, a transnational organized crime, a human rights violation, a form of gender-based violence, a threat to national security, and an economic consequence.

The business community was shocked to hear from Mr. Ronald Noble, Secretary General of the Interpol, that only one officer at Interpol works full-time on anti-trafficking. "International organizations and governments are clearly not getting the job done," said Mr. David Arkless, executive vice president of Manpower, the world's largest, non-government employer with a network of 4,300 offices in 72 countries. "With women accounting for most of the growth of the global labor force, the need for preventative anti-trafficking measures has become increasingly important," added Mr. Arkless. "As a business community we can have an impact. What we're trying to do is take a stand and say we won't tolerate humans being treated as commodities and slaves, we won't tolerate exploitation at work, and we'll ensure a zero-tolerance policy. It's a huge commitment."



Ms. Deborah Cundy, Vice President of the Carlson Companies, one of the world's largest marketing, travel, and hospitality employers with a global workforce of 190,000, shared her company's strategy to combat child sex tourism, including becoming the first US-based company to sign onto an existing code of conduct developed by the World Tourism Organization, UNICEF, and ECPAT-USA.



At the end of the roundtable, not only did participants sign onto the Ethical Principles, they also formed a working group for follow-up activities. "There will be follow up," insisted Shafik Gabr, chairman of the Arab Business Council. "After Davos, we'll meet again in Cairo in May," Gabr added. "We are not going to let this go. If we do, this problem will get very much out of control. We've declared war against it."

For more information about how you can join the business community to declare war against trafficking, please contact Wenchi Yu Perkins at wenchiyuperkins@vitalvoices.org.