MEASURING DEMOCRACIES

The UK’s international relations have been approached in a manner which attempts to blend the traditional politik of protecting the national interest with an awareness of the country’s humanitarian responsibilities. The higher priority which has been afforded international development has run parallel to a willingness to engage in the business of ‘hard security’ in protecting the national interest. The tension between these poverty-focused and security-focused elements has been evident throughout the lifetime of the administration, heralded by the furore over the ethical dimension to foreign policy.

Local government is intended to be a democratic institution that reflects local meanings with a degree of relative autonomy in exercising its functions. Those functions include the provision and delivery of state services to local populations, but also acting as an advocator in securing the delivery of publicly desired goods by private and voluntary organisations. Local government is given autonomy to eco the needs and wants of local populations within spatial context which vary from one locality to another. By allowing adaptive policies of the state to vary from area to area the varied needs and wants of the citizens are better met. This will ensure that needs and wants of citizens are easily expressed and voiced to be heard by trusted familiar faces.

On occasion it is argued the democratic state cannot function effectively if it is faced with an overly participative or demanding citizenry. In Great Britain local elections have not engaged the participation of a majority. However it might indicate that easy access to highly interconnected and coordinated institutions diminish preoccupation and challenges involved. While variety of ways facilitate inclusion in decision making individuals need not to put too much time consuming efforts in securing their needs and wants.

Looking from a different perspective, the prevalence of certain degree of lax attitude, even cynicism toward political machineries has become an issue in itself. Prevailing cynicism and mockery negates dynamics of constructive politics and lock up motivations for daring effective problem solving initiative in established democracy, causing excess of socioeconomic claims pulling in opposite directions which in turn threaten political stability. Voices turn to noises in multiplicity of low profile power seekers. Taking account of measures based on thoughtfulness is of value.

With an objective view it appears that governments are trying to reduce the cost of voting by making it easier for people to cast their vote. The philosophy appears to be that if voters are not sufficiently motivated by current arrangements to go to the voting booth, perhaps they can at least be persuaded to spend the time to mark their ballot paper by bringing the voting booth to them. Here at least there seems to be some recognition that the problem of low turnout is not simply the result of weak democratic machinery rather increasingly uninterested public attitude.

Reflection on indicators that, over two-thirds of people, in Britain, now agree ''Parties are only interested in people's votes, not in their opinions” does also brings out the fact that there is no sign of people’s engagement without stressing on recognition and spotlight. Rising expectations is the immediate outcome, for people intervening in their own affairs since perhaps some don’t see it much to be their own problem. Nonetheless, recent readings show a decline in the proportion taking critical view, such as that MPs loose touch with voters after election. If 40% believe that local councillors don't care what ordinary people think, no less than 60% said the same when they were asked about MPs in 1996. Therefore, it is far from clear that the reason why voters do not vote in local elections but do in general elections could be because of concerns over participation, rather it might be that people preference is to be engaged in issues of greater importance for widening their scopes; since global issues are becoming increasingly significant both for voters and governments as well. On the other hand, two sets of attitudes - that is levels of trust and perceptions of efficiency - appear not to make any significant difference to whether people vote in local elections or not, confirm the overall confidence on the government as concerns for collective issues such as security is rising.

An increase in national security threat leads to a decrease in preferences for social spending. This also may be true in the UK, as preferences (and spending) for defense and domestic programs are inversely related. Given that the variation in dislike connects with real world events, the pattern implies that national security drives the public’s preferred level of spending. The British public also adjusts its spending preferences in the different domestic domains in response to spending. As for defense, the public responds in thermostatic fashion over time, by adjusting its relative preferences downward as spending increases. The estimated responsiveness in each domain is approximately the same though the reliability differs, being much more pronounced for health, to a lesser extent for education, and much less so for roads. The pattern suggests that the information the public acquires about spending in the UK is remarkably accurate, perhaps even more so than in the US.

Globalization has had an impact on what the state is capable of delivering. The freedom with which capital now flows across national boundaries means, for example, that states can do little to control the level of demand in their economies. At the same time we have learnt in recent years that even if a good or activity is publicly desirable, the state is not necessarily the best mechanism for delivering it. Increasing global threats on security, of spread of disease brings policies of political parties closer together which does not excite the engagement of voters. So, as well as the state appearing less efficient, it is also suggested that a democratic political system is now less likely to be considered efficacious, that is able to respond to the demands made on it by an increasingly self-confident citizenry. As a result people are less likely to participate in conventional politics but to look instead to less conventional means such as protests, joining NGOs, engagement in various social groups in order to get their views across.

It might be anticipated that if, thanks to rising levels of education and broader options and potentials, citizens have more confidence in their own abilities, they are no longer limiting their scope, consequently not satisfied only with traditional forms of representative democracy. The media perhaps could shift the interest from allegations of impropriety which alienates public from the political system by building on dynamics of social capital channeled toward meaningful concerns.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the socio-political and cultural dynamics set into motion at the time of security threats create the conditions for potential political change – often at the hands of a feared society. Since the attacks of 9/11 four categories of urban resilience/militarization (surveillance, territorial control, contingency planning and embedding security within regeneration) have become prominent in policy debates as spaces have increasingly been scrutinized through the lens of vulnerability and resilience. Many commentators have argued that how authorities respond to the current ‘war on terrorism’ could have serious consequences for democracies. Importantly, the responses to new security challenges have occurred across a range of institutions which all have a role in the governance. They include the traditional institutions of government, both central and local; long-standing contingency planning organizations; risk management, insurance and reinsurance bodies; newer public–private organizations such as Town Centre Management bodies and Housing Associations; and a whole range of institutions which have a significant role in the governance and social control of cities, such as schools and hospitals. The responses adopted across this range are by no means uniform, nor are they necessarily cooperative or compatible, and these differences need to be specified if we are to avoid over-generalized accounts of resilience.

There are also critical questions to ask regarding the relationship between broader resilience policy for dealing with new security challenges and other emergent social polices directed at the civic realm. There are uncertainties that government and interest groups are re-appropriating the ‘terrorist threat’ agenda and constructing a ‘climate of fear’, in part, to justify policy development and implementation – for example, around countering anti-social behaviour and policies to restrict extremism in protest, the way in which public spaces are designed to monitor too dangerous other. This merging of anti-sociability measures and security within an array of policy agendas, following the events which underpin that we are living in a changing, uncertain and dangerous world, need rethinking in balances of civil liberties and concerns over the extent to which democracies are moving towards security states.



References:

Curtice, J., Public Opinion and Local Government: The Crisis of Local Democracy in Britain, Oxford University

Degrees of Democracy, Public Preferences and Policy in Comparative Perspective
Stuart N. Soroka Christopher Wlezien, Nuffield College, Oxford University, 2003

Human Security and Resilience, Chatham House, Feb 2006

Security, Terrorism and the UK, Chatham House, July 2005

Beyond the headlines, An agenda for action to protect civilians in neglected conflicts, Oxfam GB ,2003