POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND CONFLICTS

Frozen conflict leaves a negative imprint on the economic development of the conflict regions of Georgia and hampers regional cooperation in South Caucasus. The border areas are especially volatile, since conflicts result in a temporary decline of the central legal authority; and as for the existing authorities in conflict zones, they are either unable or unwilling to eradicate illegal activities. The political, security and development challenges caused both internally and externally by these conflicts can be effectively addressed through the advancement of democracy. In a partnership between civil society and government, by strengthening the rule of law and ensuring human rights, by macroeconomic stabilization, far-reaching economic reforms and a more extensive programme of privatization, Georgia can become an attractive environment for living and doing business.

Establishing peace and order is a prerequisite for transforming the confrontational environment – It will also contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the return of IDPs and refugees. The need for such measures has been highlighted by recent events in the Tskhinvali region. Economic cooperation, demilitarization and decriminalization should go hand in hand with confidence-building measures, including the implementation of joint economic projects. These projects, involving populations in conflict zones as well as returned IDPs, will have manifold effects, such as the restoration of the economy in conflict zones, and the encouragement of human contact through joint business activities, thus facilitating conciliation.

The legalization of the Georgian-Russian conflict has the highest priority. If Georgian-Russian relations are not legalized as being an inter-state conflict, the situation will move forward in the same way as previously with the same results as before. If carried to its logical conclusion, this scenario would ultimately lead to Russia becoming a party to the conflict. Because of this, Russia would not be able to have the status of a mediator in these conflicts. It is indeed a paradox that one side is both a party to the conflict and a mediator. Many experts have drawn attention to this fact but it has not been registered in any documents. the international community, and whoever would like to see an end of these conflicts, must first and foremost assess them accurately. When it comes to accurate assessment, many international organizations, intellectual groups, analytical groups and other experts have examined the conflict, but there is not one common international assessment of its nature and components.

So, at an international level, a lot of money and resources is invested in a process that has not been adequately analysed. Very often, existing conflicts are named ethnic conflicts and people understand them as such. For example, Georgians and Ossetians are thought of as two distinct ethnicities. This is a completely inadequate understanding. Ossetian society, as found in the Caucasus, is divided into many parts, which have different features. Generalization of these conflicts as ethnic conflicts is a serious mistake which, at a later stage, will result in inadequate formulations in discussions and negotiations. For example, the Georgian Ossetian conflict is sometimes characterized as consisting of four subjects: the central Georgian government, the South Ossetian separatists, representatives of North Ossetia, and Russia. This format of 3+1 creates an inadequate picture.

To correct this faulty perception is to take a specific example, the area of the Tskhivalsky region is inhabited by two main ethnicities: Ethnic Ossetians and Georgians. There is another important group there, the mixed families, which are often not taken into account as subjects in these conflicts. When some groups in negotiations are represented and not others, it is a breach of democratic principles, and therefore entire social groups are being discriminated against.

The same situation is true of the territory of Abkhazia. One of the main problems in this region is the legitimacy of the rulers. The problem concerns not only the government of the unrecognized entities, but also every other society and state that strives to legitimize its political regimes. One of the main political challenges nowadays is the creation of legitimate regimes in the whole of the region of the South Caucasus, especially the conflict zones. What does it mean legitimate powers? it means powers that represent the interests of all the groups that exist in the conflict zones. It should be pointed out again that most of these groups are discriminated against,

One of the routes through which conflicts have their impact on political development are the security services and channels. In this regard, Russia’s influence in the region is conditioned by military and security dimensions. Via this route the Russians maintain their influence on new democracies restarting their democratic development.

Other route of conflict is the political agenda. The linkage between these two factors – namely, the political agenda, which is dictated by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the security forces – is lent support by a recent statement made by Aleksandr Litvinenko, the former KGB official, that these terrorist acts were organized by the Russian security services in order to prevent the ongoing resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during the November 1999 Istanbul Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). So these channels act together. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict clearly dictates the political agenda; and of course Nagorno-Karabakh is now the main issue to discuss during these power changes. The engagement of the security services in both cases is obvious. Two revolutions from the top were about the NKR issue, about how to serve and preserve Nagorno-Karabakh. But unfortunately they were legitimated by the so-called elections, and resulted in the ligitimation of the power branches and the weakening of democratic institutions. Thus both Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan became presidents with a majority of the so-called popular vote. It is very comfortable to manipulate the masses of troubled people, who do not know what happens in reality.

To be objective all foreign political events in Armenia are in some way or other connected with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Both the government and the opposition regard this conflict either as a reason for all things going wrong in the country or as a weapon in an internal political fight. Despite this, both sides understand, but for some unexplained reason choose not mention, the certain truth that without consolidation of the whole of society and the coordination of both the government and the opposition, it is impossible to resolve the conflict. There is no constructive dialogue between the government and the opposition, nor is there any planning. All proposals to start a dialogue and have a national agreement, in the interest of national aims, have a more declamatory character.

It is interesting to consider the population of the country. These are the potential voters, and in the majority they are apathetic. They look at these political events with no interest. At best, only extravagant activities on the part of pseudo-politicians and members of parliament from time to time arouse their interest and gain popularity because of the show. But in my view there is no point in waiting for elections in order to make a proposal for conflict resolution, because I don’t think anyone -- either from Azerbaijan’s or from Armenia’s side -- would want to risk taking any steps at such a time. However, future elections have mobilized society. There can be many reasons for this. There is an increased interest in the creation of political unions, organizations, groups. These bodies prepare for elections. We have several blocs. and all of them voice criticisms -- but they could not create one programme for action. Their political platforms are so similar that even experts are not always able to distinguish between them, not to mention the population at large. In conclusion, I think a similar situation exists in other Caucasian states, and it all boils down to a banal fight for the highest office.

There is a need to approach with the thought about how much in South Caucasus’s interest it is to resolve the conflicts. The conflict resolution perspective and the future of the South Caucasus should have more priority than all small national interests. It is interesting to speculate about how probable it is that what happened in Georgia and Ukraine will be repeated in Azerbaijan.

There is always awareness that, at least in Armenia, the government came to power because of Nagorno-Karabakh’s problem, and that any change in the situation will threaten the government positions. What should be done? three or four public opinion surveys was organized and the question to Armenians was: “What do you think is the main achievement of the Armenian government in recent years?” The answers came back that other than the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, there are no achievements, not even democratic institutions or effective governance. When we asked: “What was the price for all that?” most answered that they had paid too much for it. So now people’s perception of the conflict is totally different. They think that any changes that take place will not be in the interest of peace.

All democracy rhetoric must be backed up by facts. We can talk however much about democracy, but in reality it will come only when society is ready for it. To conclude, power is a very sweet thing. As a famous English historian put it: “Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely.” So it does not matter who comes to power; what is important is to know why they came to it. Then we can count on some changes and reforms.



Extracts:
Conflicts in the South Caucasus: Political, Security and Development Challenges, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies; Chatham House, July 2005
Opening Remarks:
- Zurab Noghaideli, Prime Minister of Georgia
- Alexander Russetsky, Director, The South Caucasus Institute of Regional Security