Education

Disraeli in History

Disraeli certainly did not offer electors a programme of legislation, or even speak in public to any significant extent. In 1879–80 he was contemptuous of Gladstone's ‘spouting all over the country, like an irresponsible demagogue’, which was ‘wholly inexcusable in a man who was a statesman’ (Monypenny and Buckle, 6.524). After the 1880 election he asserted the right of politicians to challenge the spirit of the age, which was ‘generally public sentiment’ and ‘frequently … public passion’ (Hansard 3, 255, 107–8).

His success there was due to his devastating capacity to discern his opponents' weak (and strong) points: his epigrammatic sarcasm increasingly intimidated them from attacking him, and dissuaded rivals from seeking to supplant him and banish him to a dangerous exile below the gangway. Disraeli held tenaciously to the party leadership in the Commons for twenty-eight years; but he did so by dint of rhetorical bravado and dextrous party management, not by exploiting his position outside parliament….

Even so, the conclusion must be that, though only intermittently, Disraeli still succeeded, infinitely more than anyone could have imagined, in realizing the object of political life that he set out in the poem he wrote for his wife's birthday in 1846: ‘to sway the race that sways the world’ (Letters, 4.250).

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography




The Making also delivered flashes of profound insight on unexpected topics. A brief discussion of the medieval conception of freedom described the paradox that the more freedom one had the more laws one had to obey.

Sir Richard Southern: The Making of the Middle Ages


die feine englische Art (ugs.) the proper way to behave;

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40 Jahre deutsch-deutsche Beziehnungen Staats und völkerrechtliche Fragen

Prof. Dres h.c. Jochen Abr. Frowein

Max Planck Institute

Dusseldorf - Heinrich Heine University

...................................Before 1967 there was only a very limited scope relations between official bodies of the federal republic of Germany and the GDR. An important exception was the area known as inter-zone trade. This was due to the completed Agreement of 20/09/1951. After this the inter-trade zone for the Federal Republic of Germany was no foreign trade. This training was effective by a Protocol to the Treaty and an addition to the GATT and in third countries.

With the choice of social-liberal coalition in the fall of 1969 began a fundamental change in German policy towards the GDR, but also against the Soviet Union and Poland. Even the Government's statement of Brandt used the new formulation: even if two states exist in Germany, but they are not foreign for one another and their relationships to each other can only be of a particular kind. Here a breakthrough had occurred. The GDR was clearly identified as a state, on the other hand, however stressed, this relationship between West Germany and East Germany is not the type between other independent states in general.

German politics admitted to something that was discussed intensively in the working group of 1967. The example of the British Commonwealth at that time, so-called inter dual-relationships between states that had once belonged to a federation was presented. These special relationships were indirectlz recognized in the Basic Treaty with East Germany, although the East course, always made an attempt to deny the special character of these relations, wanting to be treated by the Federal Republic in its entirety as a sovereign state.

Very quickly after the formation of the social-liberal coalition negotiations began with Moscow. They were initially led by a small delegation from the Chancellor's Office, Egon Bahr. For about 50 hours there was an intensive exchange of views between Bahr and Gromyko. The result was the so-called Bahr-paper, which was the basis for the formal negotiations in July 1970 in Moscow. Although the paper was extremely controversial in the Federal Republic of Germany, but it was clearly the basis for further development.

The Delegation of Federal Minister Scheel, to which I belonged, negotiated in July 1970 in Moscow. Regarding the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany, the border line was of essential importance particularly in their nonviolence involvement. They stated that both parties today and in the future consider borders of all states in Europe as infrangible as the day of signature of this treaty, including the Oder-Neiße line, which reshaped the western borderline of Poland and the border between the Federal Republic Germany and the East Germany GDR.

Politically in the Federal Republic, this gave a massive dispute on the question whether this is not sealing the division of Germany.

Here one has to initially point out that the term "infrangible" merely protected the border against international law, which excludes actions in any way other than the peaceful reunification, like it was then 20 years later.
But in political discussion this was seen as great accomodation to the Soviet Union.
It was therefore also of greater importance that  the signing of the Treaty, the so-called Paper of German Unity has been accepted without protest by the Soviet Foreign Ministry for the Foreign Minister Gromyko.