Geopolitical Assets of the Balkans

A robust NATO enlargement in Prague, including Bulgaria and other qualified aspirants, will contribute to the victory in the war against terrorism. In other words, Bulgaria’s Euro Atlantic interest coincides with America’s strategic interest to acquire new, reliable allies in the war on terrorism and complete the project of a Europe whole, free, and secure. (Simone Saxe – Goburg) (1)

A great deal of research on the Balkans has focused on its prospects of peace and regional cooperation. Much less attention has been devoted to studying its significance as a bridge towards the Middle East and Central Asia, against the background of changing global security priorities, the importance of the region has increased, especially when considering that EU and NATO programmes have been extended towards Central Asia. As more and more countries, also outside the geographic borders of Europe, are involved in cooperation with NATO and the EU, the geopolitical centre of these previously West based institutions has implicitly moved to the east. Their respective enlargements have acquired geopolitical significance.

The importance of the Balkans in the process of NATO’s post cold enlargement changed considerably. During the Cold War the region was a crucial component of the spheres of influence approach in Great power relations and a meeting place of their respective military alliances. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and throughout the disintergration of former Yugoslavia, the prevailing rhetoric in European security suggested that the geopolitical importance of Southeast Europe was declining. It was certainly not a factor in the initial enlargement decisions of the Euro Atlantic structures. NATO recognised the geopolitical significance of the Balkans after the Kosovo crisis and especially after 11 Sept 2001.

Such perceptions have become typical of the renewed interest of the western powers in the Balkans. The change occurred parallel to Russia’s withdrawal from the regional. This principal geopolitical shift was marked by the demise of the European spheres of influence and a major repositioning of units in the regional system. Euro Atlantic integration became a priority for the countries historically oriented towards Russia (Bulgaria, Romania, and the independent states of former Yugoslavia). The former Southeast European satellites of the Soviet Union now gravitate towards Western Europe with two principal consequences. First as the dependence of Eastern Europe upon the West increases, Russia applies alternative strategies of enhancing its regional position. Second, in parallel to Eastern Europe she, too, becomes co-opted into the structures of European governance without full membership in its institutions.
The Balkans was the last point of Russia’s retreat from geopolitical influence in Eastern Europe. Russian withdrawal from peace building in Kosovo (1999-2001) exemplifies this trend. As Pavel Baev has noted: Russia’s influence in the Balkans, NATO distanced Russia from the region and made her dependent upon its strategy of security involvement outside Europe. Russia’s status in the NATO-Russia institutionalised cooperation, best described as co-opted dependency, precludes the latter’s future return to Southeast Europe. The increased geopolitical weight of the Alliance in that region was accomplished by an enhanced membership base, monitoring of democratic reforms, and close cooperation with the Balkan countries in international coalitions of the willing.

What is the adequate measure of the Balkans’ contribution to NATO? First, the rationalisation of NATO’s operations in Southeast Europe since 1999 has relied upon regional factors and anchors of stability. An expanded membership became a logical solution. Through enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania emerged as a stability factor for the entire Balkans region. Considerable strengthening of the regional political dialogue was achieved on the basis of joint political statement and partnerships with the candidate countries from the Western Balkans, as well as Greece and Turkey, thus consolidating NATO’s south eastern flank. Such high profile initiatives suggest that there are good prospects for developing a positive regional security dynamic.

Second the war on terrorism considerably increased the strategic importance of Turkey within NATO and thence, the role of the entire Balkans region as a source of diversification and reinforcement of Turkey’s military and political contribution to the Alliance. An expanded south eastern flank is needed also to revitalise the Greco Turkish relationship, frozen by Cold War regional geopolitics. The protracted character oft e Cyprus issue remains a potentially destabilising factor with serious regional spillover consequences. The unresolved territorial integrity of the island, issues of sovereignty refugees, property restitution, and security undermine security in the eastern Mediterranean.

NATO’s enlargement to the Balkans extends the framework of bilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms so far available to Greece and Turkey. It diversifies the existing NATO and US capabilities in the region and creates incentives towards participative, rather than competitive methods of resolving the outstanding controversies between the two countries. While NATO recognizes that Turkey occupies a unique position, the geographic expansion of the Alliance to Southeast Europe performs functions of actor socialisation and facilitates strategic adjustment in the entire region.

Third, the security situation in the Balkans indicates that progress towards self sustaining stability has been highly disproportionate to the extent of international involvement there. NATO’s continued presence is needed. Its south east initiative recognised that instability and conflict in southeastern Europe - which is geographically sandwiched by one NATO member in the north (Hungry) and three in the south (Greece, Italy and Turkey) – have posed direct challenges to the Alliance’s interest, during the past decade. Assuring the successful completion of military reform in the Balkans has been a major venue in the political stabilisation of the region. Democratic and civilian control over national military establishments was accomplished exclusively through the partnership for Peace Programme under NATO and US influence. Prior to the 2002 enlargement decision, Bulgaria and Romania received nearly 39 % of the 55.5 million dollar financing authorised for NATO candidates under the US Gerald B H Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act. The de-politicisation of Croatia’s army was a requirement for its recognition as a candidate country. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been criticised by the Alliance for failing to integrate its military into a joint service, undivided along ethnic lines. While such deficiencies indicate that a number of Balkan countries are still inadequately prepared to join NATO, the latter’s continued presence in the region encourages democratic and military reforms and facilitates its integration into the Europe-Atlantic structures.
Fourth, the assessment of the geopolitical relevance of the Balkans region has been revised. The Balkans is of strategic importance to Europe and NATO. Its geographic location contributes to the creation of reliable links to the Middle East and Central Asia. The foreign policy and research community has recognised the inadequacy of a contained regional approach to security. Southeast Europe presents an opportunity to open up and expand the concept of security provision to the core by projecting stability towards the outlying environment. Conceptually (but also for practical purposes), the Balkans is inseparable from the entire Black Sea region and further to the east connects to Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. Extending and more importantly, relocating a territorial and strategic potential within the geographic borders of Europe, ie, within its security system but directly operational out of area, is a significant enhancement of NATO’s comprehensive threat response capacity. The Balkans became a critical first step in the practical reform of NATO’s reconceptualisation to project stability where it matters in order to secure Europe. Southeast Europe is instrumental in the conduct of military operations against international terrorism. Bulgaria and Romania are the largest new members of the Alliance contributing real strategic assets. They have helped free up other Alliance capabilities for peace building and humanitarian assistance, and primarily in the war on terrorism. The two countries have acted as de facto Alliance members since the Kosovo and the Afghanistan campaigns. Senior US officials state that Romania’s main assets are its geographic location-proximity to trouble spots in the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa. It would be an ideal spot for the deployment of US troops on their way to Afghanistan were considerably delayed by the necessity to use the Trebizond airbase on the Turkish Black sea coast possess the same geographic characteristics as Trebizond and could serve as alternative routes, thus reinforcing NATO’s logistics base. Considerable operational and strategic capacities exist in Romania, also on its Black Sea coast. Both countries are willing to host US and NATO bases. The Balkans is part of the new US strategy of base relocation and troop reductions in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and western Europe and is related to broader strategic plans for base development in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. Equally noteworthy is the observation that public consensus in western Europe with respect to troop deployment abroad is usually hard to reach. As a comparison, the ratification of decisions and international agreements concerning arms deliveries and military contributions to missions in Afghanistan and Iraq has had consistent parliamentary support in Bulgaria and Romania. As Heritage foundation expert John Hulsman has noted, Europe is more pro American the farther east you go.

This assessment sharply contrast with a widely shared scepticism in regard to the preparedness of the Balkans to be a part of NATO. Bulgaria and Romania’s potential security assets may be offset by the need to pursue military reforms after membership. The capacity of the Alliance to absorb new members may be adversely affected. Such criticism, while duly pointing to the cost of the enlargement process, is hardly in line with the enhanced geostrategic value of enlargement. Bulgaria and Romania, as fragile as their democracy may be, have preserved civil peace in the most extreme conditions that post communist transformation has known in Eastern Europe. Ethnic conflicts from the western Balkans did not spill over their borders Bulgaria, under communism a country of intolerance vis a vis its Turkish minority, has displayed a stable model of its inter ethnic relations. This is hardly and indication of a fragile or inconsistent commitment to democratic values. Bulgaria and Romania’s NATO membership can be expected to contribute also to improving security in southeast Europe, as both countries enjoy excellent relations with crucial members of the Alliance in the region-Greece and Turkey.

The southeast enlargement, therefore, has been a positive contribution to NATO’s military and strategic capacity. It reaffirms the commitment of the Alliance to maintain its presence in the Balkans and support its political stabilisation. On the other hand, enlargement captures the positive momentum generated in the region against the back ground of changing international security dynamics. NATO and US support for the Balkan countries, including plans to deploy military personnel in bases in Romania and Bulgaria, indicates that perceptions within the Alliance are changing. It also reflects the potential of the Balkans region to act beyond security demand as a factor of security supply.



(1) Bulgarian Prime Minister lecture before the Heritage Foundation held on 24 april 2002 , www.heritage.org

Stefanov, B., NATO’s mixed policy motives in the southeast European enlargement: Revisiting Balkan Geopolitics, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol 13, no 1, April 2005

Baev, P., (1998) Russia’s departure from empire: self-assertiveness ad a new retreat, in: O Tunader, P.Baev and V. Ingrid Einagel (eds) Geopolitics in post wall Europe: security, territory nd identity, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi