Democracy and Accountability

Accountability

The concern with governance and institutions arose amidst world wide interest in democracy and democratization in the wake of the end of the cold war. Good governance is seen not just necessary condition for effective reform but also about new concerns for democratic participation and accountability. But what exactly does the concept of accountability mean? In its most literal sense, the term accountability means little more than the “ability” or the “possibility” that someone or something can be “accounted for” or “counted up”. Under this minimalist understanding, all that the accountability of government would imply is the most basic form of bookkeeping with the possibility of someone who can watch and look through the account if it is asked for. Basic bookkeeping plus checking the accounts are not powerful enough tools and push for good governance. There are suggestions that more than punishment and sanctions are required for accountability, concepts such as answerability and obligation to explain as well as enforcement meaning capacity to impose sanction are needed for efficient and effective governance. It is not enough for bureaucrats to leave their schedules open on their desks so that passersby view their reports or for members of government to communicate fully with each other. For accountability to exist there must also be a vigilant eye that gazes in from the outside. “It implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an account are asserting rights of superior authority over those who are accountable” (Mulgan, 2000:555). According to Mulgan, accountability necessarily implies power. According to classic democratic theory governments are accountable to the people because the citizens are the original power holders who delegate authority temporarily and over certain specific issues to the government.

But “horizontal” accountability relationships, between two actors of equal authority, are also common in all areas of life and politics. There are two broad schools of thought. One current equates accountability with honesty and rule following. Public servants should be evaluated, rewarded and punished based on the extent to which they desist from corrupt and illegal practices. A second current defends the idea that accountability also implies the affirmative task of effective performance and pro-active decision making (Paul, 1992). It is not very helpful for a public servant to follow the rules and not accept bribes if she does not deliver effective policy outcomes.
Passive, unconcerned, too cautious and negative bureaucratic behaviour is recognized by all for its impracticality.

To “be” accountable is to be in motion, not simply sitting in an office “open to criticism”. To “be” accountable is to work with society and accounting agencies to improve government honesty and performance instead of doing one’s best to come up with best answers to hide from inspection. Therefore the motivation for an action or decision and the quality of that action counts. Hence, it is about the state of mind of the individual to be committed and conducive to deliver.

Integrated structures with power concentrated at the top were the ideal type of bureaucracy which dominated the field of public management. Unfortunately, in the contemporary world of “flexible government” the strengthening of the command-and-control functions of government has fallen out of favor with many. However, the improvement of internal auditing, evaluation and surveillance are absolutely central elements of any pro-accountability reform package.

The recent wave of public administration reforms emphasizes both the privatization of public services and the imitation of private sector management techniques by government. The distinction is for government to sell of its monopolies or to run its institutions as a business. Although these look to tap into the energy of society to improve accountability, they have very different logic. While marketization seeks to send sections of the state off to society, social accountability seeks to invite society into the state. Therefore prioritization of consumer choice over citizen’s right to equity is an issue here. As Guy Peters (2001) has pointed out, the New Public Management (NPM) holds within it four different models of government: “Market Government”, “Participative Government”, “Flexible Government” and “Deregulated Government”. There is the danger of the possible loss of strength in the accountability signal when “citizens” are replaced with “consumers”.

One of the most popular pro-accountability reforms in recent years has been the creation of Independent Pro-Accountability Agencies (IPAs) (Ackerman, 2003). IPAs are autonomous public institutions that are responsible for holding government accountable in a specific issue area. Examples include autonomous corruption control bodies, independent electoral institutes, auditing agencies, human rights Ombudsmen, and “Public Prosecutors”. In the last decade there has been a veritable explosion in the creation of such institutions in the developing world. In Latin America, Belize, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru and Mexico have all created or revived one or more such independent institutions in the last decade. This trend is also present in Asia, Africa, Australia and Eastern Europe. Some recent examples include the new Ombudsmen in Poland (Founded in 1987), the Philippines (Founded 1989) and South Korea (Founded in 1994), the National Counter Corruption Commission in Thailand (Founded in 1998), the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales, Australia (Founded in 1988), the Public Protector in South Africa (Founded in 1994), and the Inspector-General of Government in Uganda (Founded in 1996) (Pope, 2000). Another indicator of this trend is that over 80 countries currently have a national Ombudsman while only a dozen had one only 20 years ago (Bennett, 1997). However, the performance of IPAs varies widely between countries. Indeed, it would be safe to say that there are as many cases of IPAs that serve to help governments avoid accountability as there are IPAs that successfully strengthen government accountability.

In many countries there is a long tradition of creating new “independent” bureaucracies in response to problems in order to make the government appear as if it were committed to resolving the issue at hand, whether it be corruption, human rights violations, free and fair elections, etc.. Such institutional innovations often successfully deflect criticism from the central bureaucracy, thereby permitting the government to avoid a full reform of the state. The transparency and openness to participation also varies widely between IPAs. For instance, while Ombudsmen tend to be open and to provide much needed information to the public, auditing agencies tend to be much more close lipped.

Research shows that there is a direct relationship between the effectiveness of IPAs and the level and intensity of their interaction with society (O’Donnell, 2002; Ackerman, 2003; Moreno, Crisp & Shugart, 2003; Sadek & Cavalcanti, 2003). Those IPAs that take their role as bridges seriously are the ones that fulfill their mandates more effectively, while those that separate themselves from either the government or society tend to end in isolation and ineffectiveness. Here we see that so called “horizontal” and “vertical” accountability cannot be so easily separated. The strength of government accounting agencies depends on their connection with society at large, which brings us to the notion of social accountability.

Pro-accountability reform is much more effective when societal actors play a central role. Initiatives as different as participatory budgeting, administrative procedures acts, social audits and citizen report cards all involve citizens in the oversight and control of government and therefore can be considered social accountability initiatives. Unfortunately, although society is omnipresent it is often quite dormant and apathetic. Indeed, the capacity of onlookers to not intervene to resolve problems is well known, particularly in highly modernized, urban areas. Examples abound of circles of curious passersby who do little or nothing to help victims of accidents, heart attacks or theft. In addition, civil society is not always as “pure” as it is often made out to be. Any power that is given to society risks being co-opted by powerful interest groups who only look for personal and group benefits.



Social Accountability in the Public Sector, the World Bank, 2005