The G-8: A leading role in small arms control?

http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/smallarms_g8.htm

A joint agency policy paper submitted by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Christian Aid, International Alert, Oxfam GB, and Saferworld

Summary

This week, the world's major arms supplying nations will come together for the first time to consider measures to combat the illicit trade in light weapons. The 15-17 May G-8 summit in Birmingham, UK, offers these states an historic opportunity to both endorse and expand upon an initiative underway in the United Nations. Already active on the issue, the G-8 states were among those countries that agreed the adoption of a legally binding global convention to combat firearms trafficking at a meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at the end of April.

The importance of G-8 support for small arms control cannot be underestimated. This high-profile forum includes the world's five biggest arms exporting nations which together account for nearly 90 percent of the world's arms exports. And as the major industrial powers, the G-8 have the capacity to fund programmes to tackle the problems of light weapons proliferation. Political commitment and action undertaken by these influential states would indicate that major suppliers are finally beginning to take responsibility for the devastating impact that light weapons proliferation is having on crime and violent conflict.

However, if this is to happen, the G-8 must adopt a more comprehensive approach to the issue than they are currently. The initiative agreed at ECOSOC, whilst important, only addresses one aspect of small arms proliferation - the illicit transfer of firearms to criminals. Dealing with this aspect of small arms transfers is not enough. It is vital that the G-8 address the bigger problem of the proliferation of all types of light weapons fuelling armed conflict. The boundaries between crime and conflict are increasingly blurring and trying to tackle the problem solely as a crime prevention issue will meet with only limited success. It is not only the firearms illicitly traded by criminals that cause violence and suffering. Governments must re-examine their own domestic and export policies and practices that contribute to the perpetuation of violence. The international community cannot allow governments to use controls on illicit trafficking as a smokescreen to divert attention away from their commitments and responsibilities as producers, suppliers and recipients of light weapons.

The G-8 states should broaden their efforts to combat small arms proliferation to include:

The links between crime and conflict
Committing funds to small arms control
The links between the legal and illegal trade in light weapons
Third World debt and poverty alleviation are also on the agenda of the Birmingham Summit. The G-8 states must acknowledge that, in many regions of conflict and instability, debt alleviation and poverty eradication will meet with limited success when developing countries continue to be awash with light weapons. They should further acknowledge that many of the weapons in circulation in regions of conflict were produced and supplied by the G-8 states themselves.

Small arms, big impact

The problems caused by the widespread proliferation and use of light weapons are no longer in doubt. While light weapons are not the root cause of violence, they are responsible for making crime more violent and conflict more lethal. Easy access to light weapons, by legitimate purchase or via the black market, exacerbates violations of human rights, thwarts long term sustainable development and reconstruction and prevents the peaceful resolution of conflict.

The majority of conflicts today, particularly internal conflicts, are fought with light weapons. By one account, of the all the wars being fought at the beginning of 1995, light weapons were the main equipment used in all 49. In 46 they were the only equipment. In modern warfare it is invariably the civilian populations that suffer. In all the wars fought since 1990, 84 percent of fatalities, some four million people, were civilians.

However, these weapons pose a number of problems for control problems for those seeking to establish tighter controls over their movements. Light weapons are the weapons of choice for combatants and criminals alike for a number of reasons. They are cheap, durable and robust, with few moving parts and little need for spares, and they can be assembled and transported by a child a young as ten. Lightweight and easy to conceal, these weapons are also extremely attractive to smugglers, thus regions of conflict provide fertile ground for illicit weapons trafficking. For former combatants, without access to peaceful and sustainable livelihoods, weapons become a form of currency. In order to survive, they may use them for banditry or trade them in the civilian market for other goods. Once a conflict ends, it is often extremely difficult for authorities to regain control of weapons that have flooded the country.

Increasingly, light weapons are being circulated not just from one conflict to another but from conflicts into civil society. Light weapons and small arms used for violence and crime are often left behind after conflicts end and are used to fuel post-conflict crime waves, as in El Salvador where the murder rate has increased by 36 percent since the end of the civil war. Alternatively, left over weapons are transferred across borders, as in South Africa, where the easy availability of automatic weapons from Mozambique and Angola has made the country one of the world's largest centres of illicit light weapons trafficking. It is no coincidence that South Africa now has the highest murder rate in the world.

Although the secretive nature of this trade makes it difficult to assess, some estimate that the illegal trade in light weapons accounts for more than 50 percent of all global light weapons transfers. However, unlike most major conventional weapons, the lines of supply are very long; a single weapon often passes through many hands and is "recycled" from one conflict to the next or from conflicts into civil society. Often, at least one link in this 'chain' will be legitimate. Given the blurred lines between licit and illicit trade in light weapons, a piecemeal approach to control through crime prevention will not be sufficient to reduce the violence caused by these weapons.

Momentum building around control initiatives

It has become clear that the dangers posed by light weapons are far too serious to ignore. In the past year, individual governments and institutions have sprung into action with initiatives to stem light weapons transfers at both the regional and international levels. Milestones of particular note include:

April 1998: The UN ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice endorsed a resolution calling for a legally binding convention to combat firearms trafficking. At the seventh session of the Crime Commission held in Vienna in late April, 54 countries signed a resolution calling for a legally binding convention to combat the illicit trafficking in firearms. The proposed convention will be based on the principles enshrined in the November 1997 OAS Convention (see below). The resolution garnered support from a diverse range of countries. Brazil, Canada and the United States were particularly strong advocates of the proposed resolution and managed to secure the endorsement of all G-8 states.
January-June 1998: EU negotiations on a 'Code of Conduct' to govern the legal transfer of weapons.By "setting high common standards for arms exports" and encouraging accountability and transparency, EU states can strengthen export controls, making illicit trafficking more difficult as a result. A draft proposal for an EU Code was jointly tabled by the UK and France in February, and it is anticipated that the EU will reach agreement on the issue by the end of June 1998. The US Congress and a Commission of Nobel Peace Laureates are pursuing similar efforts to establish a US Code and an International Code, respectively.
November 1997: The Organisation of American States (OAS) signed an "Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials". Signed by 27 Member States of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in November 1997, the Convention seeks to "prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms". The Convention includes practical measures such as the marking of weapons at the point of manufacture and the point of import, the harmonisation of licensing procedures and the exchange of information and expertise among the Member States on these issues.
June 1997: The European Union (EU) agreed a "Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms". Endorsed by all 15 Member States, the Programme combines measures to combat the illicit trafficking of arms through EU Member States with demand-side measures, such as providing for assistance towards building local capacity, and removing arms from society in regions of conflict.
Roots of G-8 discussions

Illicit firearms trafficking first appeared on the (then) G-7 agenda during the 1994 Economic Summit in Halifax, when leaders highlighted the economic and social costs of crime. By the time of the Denver Summit in June 1997, illicit weapons trafficking had become a G-8 priority and decisions to consider a "new international instrument' and a "stronger international regime" were included in the summit's Final Communiqué'. The US State Department provided G-8 states with a proposed outline for a legally binding international instrument in autumn 1997. The proposals closely paralleled the central tenets of the OAS convention, including, firearm identification at the point of manufacture and import and harmonisation of licensing procedures.

Initially, EU members of the G-8 were reluctant to agree to such a formulation, not yet having reached EU-wide consensus on harmonising import/export certificates or marking weapons at the point of manufacture and import. However, a strong degree of consensus emerged in G-8 negotiations early this year and by March the G-8 states agreed to call for a legally binding convention based on the OAS model. Following the resolution at ECOSOC last month, it is expected the Birmingham communiqué will call for the swift implementation of a convention through the UN Crime Commission.

An international convention would be a welcome development. However, ECOSOC is only mandated to address civilian firearms trafficking in a crime context. This restricted mandate will necessarily limit both the scope and effectiveness of a potentially far-reaching initiative. It is vital, therefore, that the G-8 develop a much more wide-ranging approach.

Recommendations

Regardless of the ultimate forum for negotiation, it is crucial that the G-8 take this timely opportunity to develop a comprehensive approach to light weapons control that addresses all aspects of the problem, including those weapons that are "legally" supplied to conflict or conflict vulnerable societies. As the world's wealthiest and most powerful states, the G-8 nations are well placed to encourage global participation in an international control effort. Moreover, they should accept their responsibility to fund practical measures to control light weapons proliferation.

Link between crime and conflict

The realities of social integration and the porous nature of international borders has blurred the lines which distinguish conflict and crime. The militarisation of civil society is a feature of many post-conflict regions; in many parts of the world, black marketeers offer weapons that at one time were used to fight wars. Weapons attained and used for violence in armed conflict are now traded easily across borders and put to criminal use, allowing assault weapons and military-style arms to fall into civilian hands. In addition, for former soldiers with few marketable skills, weapons become a form of currency. Inadequate demobilisation after conflicts, therefore, fuels crime and banditry. Any initiative undertaken by the G-8 will be far more relevant to countries in regions of conflict if these links between crime and conflict are acknowledged. The G-8 should therefore:

Make an explicit link between crime and conflict within the final communiqué.
Advocate that the proposed legally binding instrument to combat illicit firearms trafficking includes a clause to incorporate mandatory destruction of weapons in all UN peacekeeping missions, demobilisation programmes, weapons collections, amnesties and seizures.
Develop initiatives within other multilateral organisations to combat illicit trafficking at the regional and sub-regional levels which link the problems of crime and conflict. All G-8 states should engage their own regional fora on control initiatives, including the EU, the OAS, the CIS and ASEAN;
Commit funds and re-orientate aid towards small arms control

Considering the interest of G8 states in measures currently being pursued at the UN, the final communiqué should reflect a commitment from each state to fully participate in projects and fund initiatives in the field of practical disarmament. All efforts to tackle illicit arms trafficking will be doomed to failure if they are not properly resourced. As the leading industrialised nations, the G-8 must, therefore, accept their responsibility for funding such initiatives. Considerable investments of human and financial resources are required for any G-8 initiative to move from a statement of intent to effective and practical control measures. Many of the countries directly affected by the proliferation of light weapons - both legal and illegal - lack the capacity and infrastructure to control the problem. The G-8 states should therefore announce a commitment of funds for:

Fund the swift implementation of the UN Convention to control firearms trafficking;
Participation by regions directly affected by light weapons proliferation in the Interpol Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database (IWETS)database, the only existing international database for stolen and recovered weapons, and in the implementation of the UN Convention.
An important way of securing funds for implementing effective firearms control is to recognise the link between security and long term development and stability. Controlling light weapons is not just a law enforcement issue. Often the insecurity and violence fuelled by the spread of light weapons means that countries cannot make use of economic and social development assistance. Yet although the link between development and security is increasingly being recognised, programmes to boost internal security and arms control in conflict-prone regions remain poorly funded. A commitment from the G-8 to use a proportion of development aid for security projects would have a powerful impact. The G-8, therefore, should:

Endorse the 'security first' approach to development co-operation which acknowledges that a secure environment is a pre-requisite for long-term development and so incorporates support for police training, strengthening border controls, demobilisation and the reintegration of soldiers into development assistance.
Establish a special 'security assistance' fund for countries in regions of conflict to enable them to tackle the problems of light weapons.
Link legal and illegal light weapons transfers

Targeting illicit trafficking may allow governments to clamp down on the illegal market trade but dealing with this aspect of firearms transfers is not enough. It is not only the firearms illicitly traded by criminals that cause violence and suffering. The international community cannot allow governments to use controls on illicit trafficking as a smokescreen to divert attention away from their commitments and responsibilities as producers, suppliers and recipients of light weapons. Furthermore, the distinction between legal and illegal is often blurred. It is more accurate to talk of a 'grey' market than a black one. This grey market relies partly on the use of legal loopholes such as the absence of controls on third-party brokering, inadequate or neglected end-use guarantees, or on governments turning a blind eye to questionable deals. The G-8 should urgently address this problem.

The link between legal exports and illegal transfers should be made within the final communiqué.
The G-8 countries should the use summit as an opportunity to discuss, strengthen and internationalise Britain's proposal for an EU Code of Conduct "setting high common standards governing arms exports".
The G-8 should collectively identify the loopholes in their control systems which may be aiding the development of grey market trading, and introduce a coordinated international programme to close them down.
Conclusion

A coherent and comprehensive approach to small arms proliferation is required. Efforts to combat illicit trafficking must be matched with equal vigilance on the licit side. Ultimately, it is the presence of light weapons in situations of potential violence and instability, and not the legal and illegal means by which they have arrived at their destination that is at issue. Commitment by the G-8 countries has the potential to be enormously influential. A comprehensive approach to small arms control which acknowledges the links - domestic to international, legal and illegal, crime and conflict - and provides the resources to help address them would have a multiplier effect. It could influence national governments, regional and international bodies to address other aspects of the problems of light weapons proliferation which are so desperately in need of attention. This opportunity should not be missed.

Date of original publication: April 1998